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A LECTURE ON APPELLATE ADVOCACY*
Karl N. Llewellyn**
Well, Brethren and Sistren, I find myself in a completely
impossible position: The Bar Association has made it clear that
beginning at eight o'clock I cannot possibly talk beyond sixty
minutes. And the Law School has made it clear that beginning at
8:30 I cannot possibly talk more than thirty minutes. That gives
me, as far as I can judge by my watch, something like fifteen to
seventeen minutes to deal with a topic which when adequately
presented by Frederick Bemays Wiener-and I think rather
* This was a Harris Trust Lecture delivered by Professor Llewellyn to a meeting of the
Indiana Bar Association and the Indiana University Law School Association held at
Indianapolis on February 8, 1962, just a few days before his death. The speech as published
here is taken from a stenographic transcript recorded contemporaneously with delivery. A
few deletions and corrections have been made in the transcript; but only those made
necessary by the original medium of oral delivery. Footnotes have been added where
necessary to clarify a reference. The primary objective here, however, is to convey the
Llewellyn manner as advocate and teacher. ED. (The lecture was originally published at 29
U. Chi. L. Rev. 627 (1962), and it is reproduced here by license from the Copyright
Clearance Center. The addition of this explanatory parenthetical is the sole respect in
which this text varies from the original.)
** Professor of Law, University of Chicago, 1951-62. University of Lausanne, 1911;
University of Paris, 1914; B.A., Yale University, 1915; LL.B., Yale University, 1918;
Instructor of Law, Yale University, 1919-20; J.D., Yale University, 1920; Practiced law in
New York City, 1920-22; Assistant Professor of Law, Yale University, 1922-23; Associate
Professor of Law, Yale University, 1923-25; Associate Professor of Law, Columbia
University, 1925-27; Professor of Law, Columbia University, 1927-30; Guest Professor,
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State Laws from New York, 1926-51; Chief Reporter, Uniform Commercial Code, 194162; President, Association of American Law Schools, 1949-50; awarded Henry M. Phillips
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monographs on commercial law, jurisprudence and the legal profession.
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adequately presented-occupies about 500 pages.' (Laughter.)
Under these circumstances I trust that I, as I attempt to hold
myself within reasonable bounds, may have unanimous consent,
to, as the people in Congress say, "enlarge my remarks"?
(Laughter.)
Is there anybody who objects to my quote "enlarge my
remarks," unquote? Mr. Chairman, I ask you to note that there is
no objection. (Laughter.)
I'm going to try to be just as short as I can, and you
understand it's utter nuts to attempt to tell anybody how to argue
an appeal in two hours.
Let's begin with a few of the presuppositions before one
even starts to talk; the things that are completely presupposed.
When I was a kid at Yale, Old Hadley, the President, used to tell
the Chapel speaker, "Few souls are saved after the first twenty
minutes." (Laughter.) I should alter that general approach in
terms of "No appellate advocate is created inside of an hour."
(Laughter.)
One has to assume a few things. One has to assume, for
example, that you know about Davis' magnificent address in
1940, on how to handle oral argument on appeal.2 One has to
assume that you know about what I think is an even better job:
Whitman Knapp's job, in 1959, Why Argue an Appeal, and If
So, How?, 3 or Kenison's beautiful study of the general problem
of appeal,4 or that beautiful book by Fritz Wiener, now in two
editions, backbone, and very little waste space, on effective
appellate advocacy 5 and the approach to appellate advocacy by
6
way of the federal courts.
I say one has to assume this. One has to assume that
everybody understands that to handle an appeal without oral
argument is silly. I see no reason to argue that to you. 7 If you
don't understand that, why, what's the use of talking to you?

1. WIENER, BRIEFING AND ARGUING FEDERAL APPEALS (1961).
2. Davis, The Argument of an Appeal, 26 A.B.A.J. 895 (1940).
3. 14 Record of N.Y.C.B.A. 415 (1959).
4. Kenison, Some Aspects of Appellate Arguments, I N.H.B.J. 5 (1959).
5. WIENER, EFFECTIVE APPELLATE ADVOCACY (1950).
6. Op. cit. supra note 1. This book is denominated "A new edition of 'Effective
Appellate Advocacy,"' title page.
7. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 240 (1960).
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One has to assume such other minor things as that the
fellow who is about to have the appeal can read. A broad
assumption, I know. (Laughter.) And one has to assume that he
knows that a sentence must be so written that the punch word
comes at the end. And if you haven't got this to work with, you
just can't talk. In even the half time that I haven't got.
(Laughter.)
Nevertheless, I do think that once one makes those
assumptions, there are some things that one can press-at least
as to aspects which are not yet in the now growing, and, in my
opinion, wisely and beautifully growing, literature. I don't think,
for example, that that other piece of underpinning of any theory
at all in the preparation of an appeal-the study of the particular
tribunal before which the case is to come-I don't think that that
has been pressed with anything like the power with which it
ought to be pressed.
I hear a great deal from the skillful advocates, when they
get around to such a speech as I'm trying to make, about
"sinking yourself in the facts." And "sinking yourself in the law
of the case." I don't hear so much, even from the really good
ones, about how you have to begin by "sinking yourself in the
tribunal" to which you are to argue. And I am about to urge
upon you that it is through your understanding of the tribunal
that you understand what facts to look at and what part of the
authorities and what shape of the authorities to build to handle
the facts in your particular case.
I say again: You begin before you get your case. Not only
with a fundamental understanding of the language, but with an
understanding of the appellate tribunals in your jurisdiction
before whom you are about to argue. For, let me say this clean,
clear, hard, and unmistakably: The job of an appellate argument
is to win a particular case before a particular tribunal, for a
particular client. And, since that is so, it begins with the tribunal.
Long before the case comes into your office, you should have
been studying that tribunal, indeed any appellate tribunal before
whom you may have a case to argue. It is that tribunal's view of
the facts which will control. It is that tribunal's view of the
authorities which will control. It isn't yours. And there is
nothing out there-as Holmes put it once, there is no "brooding
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omnipresence in the sky" 8-that's

going to work for your client

or for you.
So we come to the general theory of tribunals, especially of
the American appellate tribunal. This I have developed at very
considerable length, and, as I am told by many of my readers,
with unutterable difficulty in a book called The Common Law
Tradition: Deciding Appeals. To any of you who are lawyers, I
nevertheless insist you can't afford not to work through that
unbelievably badly written book. (Laughter.) The essence of it,
for our purposes immediately here at hand, is that it
demonstrates, and I think it demonstrates incontrovertibly, that
our authorities, be they case law authorities or statutory
authorities, are truly multiform; run in not one direction, but
seven. (And I don't see anybody challenging this yet. I don't
know how many reviews your Chairman mentioned, but he
didn't mention nearly as many as there are. [Laughter.] And
there hasn't been anybody who has been ready to get up and
deny that the book demonstrates this.) I didn't say "not one but
two"; I said "not one, but seven." And if you need, I will say
forty-eight. But seven is enough to make the point that when you
approach the authorities you approach a malleable, a
manipulable mass of material.
If the appeal has any reason to have been brought at all, or
has any reason to be defended at all by the respondent, the
authorities are available on each side in a letter perfect case in
the hands of any really competent technician. And this is simple
as pie. The question is: Which view-justifiable, decent,
righteous, and rightful-which view, among the possibilities, is
the Court going to accept?
The second thing that the book does-and I think this is
again demonstration and not an expression of opinion-is to
make it clear that as our courts go about their job of
simultaneously satisfying their duty to the law and their duty to
justice, both of which they understand, both of which they
cherish, both of which they labor over and under, their choice
among the various doctrinally correct possibilities turns on the
Court's view of what is right and decent for the community in
regard to the outcome of the case.
8. Southern Pacific Co. v. Jenson, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (dissenting).
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And this leads, you see, to a repetition of the three things
which underlie any technique of legal argument:
First, because it is the Court's choice which is going to
determine the outcome, you have to begin by study of the
tribunal.
Second, because the facts are not the facts out there
somewhere, but are the facts as seen by the Court, you have to
study the Court first and see the facts through the eyes of the
Court.
And third, since the authorities which are the controlling
authorities are multiform, multi-possible, you have to study the
way the court sees authorities. They are in the main
extraordinarily careful in their handling of authorities.
I'm not going to spend any time on that. I simply tell you:
Go look at the book. They are craftsmanlike, in their handling of
authorities.
But the thing that guides them into this arrangement of the
available, as distinct from that other arrangement of the
available, is their sense, their view of sense, for the whole of us.
And thank God that this is so. It's against this background, and
only against this background, that we can start thinking in terms
of technique. Do I make myself clear?
What I have to say about techniques presupposes that you
can read English, write English, understand your Court, and
understand your basic theory. Once you have got those things
clean, we can begin to talk for the little time that we have left
about how to go about doing it.
Of course the first thing that comes up is the issue and the
first art is the framing of the issue so that if your framing is
accepted the case comes out your way. Got that? Second, you
have to capture the issue, because your opponent will be framing
an issue very differently. You have got to so frame yours that it
"sells the Court," to use the term of the marketplace, which I
abhor-so that it "captures the field," is what I prefer, because I
see this not as a matter of the marketplace but as a matter of war,
once you're really into a case of appellate advocacy. And third,
you have to build a technique of phrasing of your issue which
not only will help you capture the Court but which will stick
your capture into the Court's head so that it can't forget it.
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You see how all this depends upon the underpinning.
Nevertheless, I go on now to matters of technique. And if I may,
for just a moment, I'm going to depart from appellate advocacy
in order to present to you the problem of issue framing and issue
capture. I'm going to go into this, in the first instance, in two
cases.
One of my instances comes out of the Gospel of Matthew,
in the 22nd Chapter, and has to do with a curiously great lawyer,
whose name is Jesus of Nazareth. He was in a jam, a rather
curiously modem kind, when a colonial power was under severe
attack by a nationalist revolt. He was representing not the
respectable leaders of the national group, but folks who were
regarded as not at all so nice, and he was acquiring a following
that was extremely uncomfortable to the nationalist leaders of
the moment. So they sent around people to put to him a nice
interview. (If it had been today, there would have been
television cameras and a large battery of reporters.) And the
question was: "Is it lawful to give tribute unto Caesar?"
("Caesar"-that's the Roman Emperor, that's the colonial
power.) And it was set up so beautifully, you see. "There's a
row about this," they said, "but you're so judgmatic." That's a
translation, which is a very bad word for the purpose, I think,
but you get the point. If he said, "Yes," all the nationalists would
be down on him-(indicating); if he said, "No, damn the
colonial powers"-Police, get him by the neck.
In this situation, this extraordinarily skillful lawyer posed
an issue in such fashion, (a) that it solved his case, and (b) that it
sold the very adverse tribunal that he was dealing with.
Do you remember the story? He said, "Show me a coin."
And somebody pulled out a coin. And he said, "Whose is the
head and the name?" It was a Roman coin which showed the
head of Caesar, and the name of Caesar. And then he said-the
issue has been posed, you see this? The issue has been accepted.
The adversary was sucked in; Lord, how he was sucked in--or
"they" as the case may be. The minute that coin was produced
and looked at there is no other answer. "Unto Caesar," says he,
"that which is Caesar's; and unto God, that which is God's."
But the answer is of no value, until first the issue has been
posed. And secondly, the issue has been sold. And third, the
issue has been phrased to that you can't forget it.
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Do I make my point?
And then there's another instance by this same amazing
lawyer-all of this applies to appellate argument, of course; I'm
just picking first instance cases because these are the finest that I
know-that's out of John, Chapter 8. This is the case of a lawyer
who has no facts and has no law and still so poses his issue as to
win his case. And this is the thing for you to think about: Most
of us take weeks to approach it, but this job was done, as far as
our report goes, in the course ofjust a few moments.
The case was this: There was woman, caught in adultery,
and she was dragged in. And she was put into the center of the
circle. And the accusers said, "taken in the very act"-that takes
care of the facts, doesn't it? And they said, "Moses in the law
said"--in the law (and they were quite right)-"such shall be
stoned." I will not go into the matter of stoning. I just remind
you of the situation.
The report says that at this point Jesus stooped and wrote
upon the ground, and John adds a very interesting additional
observation, "as if he had not heard"--and I think he was
fighting for time. And, by golly, I think he really needed it.
(Laughter).
At the same time I call your attention to the trial lawyer
tactics: He not only got time, but he also got complete
concentration of attention. Then he rose up, surrounded with
complete and utter silence, and he said (you remember this one,
too, don't you?-no law, no fact, but we're posing the issue just
the same; we're posing it so that it's going to be accepted, and
we've chosen it so that it's going to win the case) "He that is
without sin among you, let him first cast a stone." And our
report is that they slunk away. You can't stone unless somebody
starts.
That's a very interesting observation of John, who was no
mean observer; he says the eldest first. (Laughter.)
Now this is the kind of thing that you do by genius, by
inspiration, by experience, or, if you have none of these, by hard
work. (Laughter.) You reach for the appropriate posing of the
issue. And it has to be built in terms of your tribunal.
Let me give you a couple of modem instances which show
how it can be done, either well or badly, without the benefit of
genius or of inspiration. As a matter of fact, the cases I've given
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you are ones in which I think Jesus was suffering under the
hardships of mortality, and rather transcendentally. But that has
nothing to do with the case.
First is a case in which an entrepreneur of the big oil
operating type (an amazing fraternity; small but amazing) had
put together a combine between a French syndicate and an
American group, and had operated under the well-understood
rule, at least in France, that when you did this kind of thing and
got it all put together, you got your commission from each side
because you had done your job like a decent citizen. He got his
commission from the French combine and the Americans, being
sweet people, told him to go to hell. (Laughter.) So he sued.
This issue turned on whether, being an agent, he had not
gotten his commission from his principal. And he found in the
books, or at least his counsel did, a rule of "double agency"
which you will find in all books on agency. If there is a
complete disclosure made to each side of all points all the way
along the line, you can be entitled to a commission from each
side. Thus, there was a possibility of double agency, and his
counsel, being in my opinion complete idiots, argued the case on
this basis.
Now if I am right about the nature of the tribunal, and the
nature of the general state of facts, as seen by tribunals, they
could not have been sillier. Agency connotes to the ordinary
American judge (a) loyalty and (b) diligence as duties. And you
can't possibly-you can't possibly simultaneously satisfy
loyalty to two people. I may quote again from a gentleman
whom I have mentioned earlier this evening: "Man cannot serve
two masters"; this is in the minds of American judges. And, you
can't have diligence in favor of both at once.
So this case was taken up on that basis, and was of course
lost.9 I don't see how it could help but be lost. But we have
sitting in our books a completely different concept, the concept
of brokerage. Brokerage involves, in nobody's mind, any
suggestion of loyalty and diligence. It involves only what was in
the facts, to wit, complete disclosure; and the job of the broker is
to bring people together into a deal that they both like, or they
all like, if it happens to be a multi-party transaction. Here was
9. Reese v. Texas Co., 292 N.Y. 583, 55 N.E.2d 48 (1943).
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the wherewithal to put the facts into a frame that would fit a
body of law available and comfortable, emotionally comfortable
to the Court. Being missed, the case was lost. I do not say it
would have been won had it been done this way. What I do say
is, instead of a scattered shot-gun setup, twenty to one against
you, you had something like an even chance. And I would have
been willing, under good argument, to take the loser's half of the
bet.
Let's take another: In a case known as Jenkins against
Moyse, 10 we had two utterly dirty lice opposed to each other. I
have never seen a case in which the stink was less easy to take.
We had on the one hand an enterpriser who was in financial
difficulty and had no character; and on the other hand we had
one of the money lenders who reminds you of Shylock in his
worst moments.
The situation was one in which this somewhat distressed
borrower was looking for money, and the lender said, "I can't
possibly give it to you unless you incorporate." And this was in
New York.
Now, the New York Usury Law is quite queer in two
aspects; at least it's untypical of the country. If you have a
usurious transaction, New York is tougher than any law I know.
You don't forfeit the interest, you don't forfeit double interest,
you forfeit the whole, if it's usurious at all. And there's a special
provision that says that it if there's any security, that's void,
too." So that the equitable attempt to save at least the principal
and make the debtor-what is the old phrasing?-"do equity if
he is to get equity" is gone by statute in New York if it's a
usurious transaction.
But there is a later New York statute that says that a
business corporation cannot plead usury. 12 So what this lender
did was to say, "Look, incorporate yourself, my friend, and then
I will give you $25,000, against your note for $40,000, at 6 per
cent on the 40." (Laughter.) And the borrower incorporated
himself, and he got this deal. Then, being just as sweet smelling
10. Jenkins v. Moyse, 254 N.Y. 319, 172 N.E. 521 (1930).
11. N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 373. The 1960 Session of the New York legislature
amended this provision so that if the lender is "a savings bank, a savings and loan
association, or a federal savings and loan association" only the interest is forfeited.
12. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 374(1).
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a skunk as the lender, he is bringing a suit to have the mortgage
declared void, for usury. (Laughter.) And you know, what can
you do about this? You see, you haven't got a decent citizen in
striking distance. (Laughter.)
Two lower court instances decided that this was an evasion
of the Usury Law.' 3 And I think this is a reasonable decision. It
is not the only reasonable decision; it is a reasonable decision.
What interests me is what happened in the Court of Appeals.
New counsel came in, and new counsel made clear to the Court
that really this provision about corporations, business
corporations not being allowed to plead usury, was a defense of
the defenseless. That in the absence of such a provision, people
who were most in need of money would be cut off from the
money market completely by the Usury Law. And the
legislature, with the wisdom inherent in the New York
Legislature (Laughter), had chosen to open up an avenue
whereby people in desperate need of funds, and in not too good
financial condition, in business transactions, could have a
wherewithal to pay whatever was needed to give them the
money that they needed. And the Court looked at this and said,
"This is fine."
The thing that I want you to see is that even in the
construction of a set of statutes, the thing that was moving the
Court was what had been brought home to them by counsel. It
made sense, for the situation, "to decide my way," and so the
Court selected, and the Court reversed the lower court.
But the situation has to be so diagnosed, and the issue has
to be so framed, and the sense had to be made so clear that this
particular possible way of handling that statute carries the Court,
instead of being rejected. 14
Let's take a further instance, and a final one, on this
particular point. There was for a long time in Pennsylvania a
machinery-am I boring you? (Laughter)-There was for a long
time in Pennsylvania a machinery of mining anthracite coal,
which moved in terms of leaving supporting pillars of coal as
you went further and further into the seam. The idea was that
13. Jenkins v. Moyse, 229 App. Div. 743, 241 N.Y. Supp. 901 (1930).
14. The opinion in the New York Court of Appeals was by Lehman, who understood
both real estate and business finance. (See LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION:
DECIDNG APPEALS 228, n. 25 (1960).)
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when you finally got to the end of the seam, you would come
back out, and take out the pillars, because they had to be pretty
big pillars. They were economically significant pillars.
Some lawyer, somewhere along the line, got the notion that
the normal right of a purchase of surface rights to support
against subsidence could taken out of the rights of the purchaser
by explicit clause in the deed. Do I make this thing clear?
Ordinarily, when we divided the law into surface rights and
mineral rights, the guy that had the surface rights is supposed to
have surface rights, and so he's supposed to be able to build or
farm or do whatever he wants. But this shrewd lawyer-I will
call him "a Philadelphia lawyer"--I don't know who he was,
and nobody knows who he was-conceived the notion that you
could cut out of your deed the right to have the surface stay
even. So that when the time came that you wanted to mine out
the pillar, and the surface dropped, the guy who had bought the
rights on top had no objection. (Laughter.) And this got to be so
firmly established in the practice of Pennsylvania law that the
right to support from the bottom got a name in the practice
which I think exists nowhere else in the country. It was the third
estate in land. There were surface rights, mineral rights, and the
right to support from the bottom. (Laughter.)
Well, this moves perfectly well, and without any trouble to
anybody, until the time comes that over one piece of anthracite
mines population begins to really encroach and a whole chunk
of the city of Scranton finds itself built on this kind of deed, you
see, which was a standard deed. (You know what happens when
you buy real estate, anywhere. What kind of a deed do you get?
You get the kind of deed that's customary in the community.
Suppose you say, "I want a different kind of deed." What
happens? They say, with all respect to the ladies present, "Go to
hell." And this is what you get. And you just get what you get.)
(Laughter.) But it did happen, I repeat, that the city of Scranton
really grew out over quite a piece of this anthracite stuff.
Then came the time when they came to the end of the seam
and it began to become clear that they were going to go right
back, letting the pillars come out. And what would happen to the
surface, the business of the people on that surface? (Laughter.)
And humanitarian elements and interested elements got together,
and the Legislature passed a statute, that forbade the taking out
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of pillars in such fashion as to endanger life. 15 I abbreviate it
very greatly.
A suit by the owner of a single residence finally came
before the Supreme Court and the defense challenged the
constitutionality of this statute. 16 John W. Davis was for the
defendant coal company and I am excited by his posing of the
issue, in the oral argument. (It isn't done nearly as well in the
brief.) Tradition has it that Davis opened his argument before
the Supreme Court in language substantially equivalent to what I
am about to state: "This case involves the question of whether
the Legislature of Pennsylvania has the constitutional power to
donate the property of the Pennsylvania Coal Company to Mr.
and Mrs. Patrick Mahon." (Laughter.) The case was won by Mr.
Davis, Mr. Justice Holmes writing the opinion.
But look at what a posing of the issue; look at the way in
which the entire body of interest, of the state, was removed from
discussion by "Mr. and Mrs. Patrick Mahon." This is the kind of
thing I'm talking about. And what I want to bring home to you is
that it doesn't take axe murder and love nest, and it doesn't take
a cause c6lbre, and it doesn't take anything at all in the way of
extraordinary stuff, to put to the appellate advocate this type of
problem.
My time is running out. I'm going to give you another very
simple instance of this matter of issue posing, with a twist, if I
may, of thought. The twist is that if you can make your
weakness into your strength, that is what you are primarily
gunning for. When you can take everything that the other fellow
has got, and turn it your way.
The art of ring fighting has entirely changed since I was
young. But when I was young, there was a style of ring fighting
that was called the "sidestep." People in those days rushed, and
the skillful man, instead of meeting the rush, slid it, and then
socked the rusher as he went by. I don't know how much that
means to any of you who don't know anything about ring
fighting anyhow, but I trust I shall make it clear as we approach
the next case, which is a simple torts case, a simple traffic case.

15. Penn. Laws 1921, pp. 1198-1200 (Kohler Act) PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, §§ 661-71
(1954).
16. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
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What you have is a railroad which, under compulsion of
statute, had built an underpass in the middle of the city to avoid
a grade crossing. Now, when you build an underpass in the
middle of the city you have to put steel pillars in, or else, if you
don't put steel pillars in, you have to build a type of arch
construction which at the time of the building of this underpass
was technically almost impossible, and certainly outrageously
expensive. The railroad, then, had built its underpass and had
protected the trains that went over the underpass by way of steel
pillars. Then the railroad got worried and it built on each side of
the underpass a big concrete mound in between the two traffic
lanes. The concrete mound was about five feet high and fairly
wide and made it possible, you see, in case of trouble not to hit
the pillar head on, but to climb the mound instead. Is this clear?
(Laughter.) This makes a great deal of difference, as you will
see in the case.
What happened then was that on a somewhat icy night, at
about three in the morning, an obviously drunken driver slipped
on his way down into the underpass, got over onto the mound,
and piled his car up. But he only broke in the front of the car,
and stayed alive, whereas had he hit under the same
circumstances a straight, steel pillar, we wouldn't have had a
lawsuit. We would only have had a visit from the-from the
dead man.
And now with that the situation, the plaintiff's lawyer made
magnificent play of the intrusion upon the street of an
outrageous interference with traffic-a construction so
dangerous to human life as to be wanton and willful within the
meaning of the rule that says contributory negligence is no
defense.
(I don't know what the rule is in Indiana, but in Illinois, if
the risk imposed by the defendant is wanton and willful, then
contributory negligence, which was plainly in the case, was no
defense.)
And the idiotic lawyer for the defendant didn't make clear
that this mound of concrete was a safety device. That when
operating under compulsion of statute to build an underpass with
steel supports, you were up against the proposition that no
matter what you did, little though you liked to, you endangered
life, but that if you spent extra money and built a concrete
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mound, you could keep life from being sacrificed, even by
people like this plaintiff. (Laughter.)
See, this is the kind of thing I'm talking about in terms of
setting the facts up to frame the issue your way. So this case also
was lost just as Pennsylvania and Mahon, which I think should
have been won by the other side, was lost, largely in terms of
issue posing.
Will you give me ten minutes more? (Applause.)
I've got first a corollary that derives from what I have been
saying, and that is that the statement of facts, be it in the brief or
be it oral, is the complete guts of your case. And I'm going to
give you two statements of fact, one by an utter master, and
another in the exactly same case, as an effort to show you how it
can be done just the other way on the same facts and the same
case.
The statement by the master is Cardozo in Wood against
Lady Duff-Gordon.'7 And you will get that, as I read it to you.
You must remember that Cardozo was a truly great advocate,
and the fact that he became a great judge didn't at all change the
fact that he was a great advocate. And if you will watch, in the
very process of your listening to the facts, you will find two
things happening. The one is that according to principle number
one, you arrive at the conclusion that the case has to come out
one way. And the other is, that it fits into a legal frame that says,
"How comfortable it will be, to bring it out that way. No trouble
at all. No trouble at all."
"The defendant styles herself'-now watch the way in
which she is subtly made into a nasty person--"The defendant
styles herself 'a creator of fashions.' Her favor helps a sale.
Manufacturers of dresses, millinery, and like articles are glad to
pay for a certificate of her approval. The things which she
designs, fabrics, parasols, and what not, have a new value in the
public mind when issued in her name. She employed the
plaintiff to help her turn this vogue into money."' 8
Does this sound-this is an interposition-does this sound
like a business deal? Does a business deal sound like a legally
enforceable view? Nothing is being said about that. But watch it
17. Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 222 N.Y. 88, 118 N.E. 214 (1917).
18. Id. at90. 118 N.E. at 214.
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grow on you. And if I hadn't stopped to tell you about it, it
would have grown until you just took it, without a word.
"He was to have the exclusive right"--watch this
language-"exclusive right"--what wonderful legal language,
to make it legally enforceable-"He was to have the exclusive
right... to place her own designs on sale, or to license others to
market them. In return, she was to have one-half of 'all profits
and revenues' derived from any contracts he might make. The
exclusive right was to last at least one year from April 1, 1915,
and thereafter from year to year unless terminated by notice of
ninety days."' 9
My heavens, isn't this legal?
"The plaintiff says that he kept the contract on his part, and
that the defendant broke it. She placed her indorsement on
fabrics, dresses and millinery without his knowledge, and
withheld the profits. He sues her for the damages, and the case
comes here on demurrer.
"The agreement of employment is signed by both parties. It
has a wealth of recitals. The defendant insists, however, that it
lacks the elements of a contract. She says that the plaintiff does
not bind himself to anything. It is true that he does not promise
in so many words that he will use reasonable efforts to place the
defendant's indorsements and market her designs. 2 °
Now, is there any way to bring that case out, except one?
Isn't it obvious that we are going to imply a promise on the part
of the plaintiff which will satisfy the 21requirement of
consideration and the decency of the situation?
All right, now try this: "The plaintiff in this action rests his
case upon his own carefully prepared form agreement, which
has as its first essence his own omission of any expression
whatsoever of any obligation of any kind on the part of this
same plaintiff. We thus have the familiar situation of a venture
in which one party, here the defendant, has an asset, with what
is, in advance, of purely speculative value. The other party, the
present plaintiff, who drew the agreement, is a marketer eager
19. Ibid
20. Ibid.
21. "We think, however, that such a promise is fairly to be implied.... A promise may
be lacking, and yet the whole writing may be 'instrinct with an obligation,' imperfectly
expressed.... If that is so, there is a contract." 222 N.Y. at 91, 118 N.E. at 214.
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for profit, but chary of risk. The legal question presented is
whether the plaintiff, while carefully avoiding all risk in the
event of failure, can nevertheless claim full profit in the event
that the market may prove favorable in its response. The law of
consideration joins with the principles of business decency in
giving the answer. And the answer is no."
Same case. Entirely the same case. But it brings me to the
next fundamental point, which is that if you have an intelligent
appellant, to rest upon his statement of the facts, if you are the
respondent, is suicide. Did you hear me? If he is any good,
you're cooked. (Laughter.) You have a positive case to make,
and you can only make it by restating the facts so that they fit
into your picture of what the whole thing is. And I think with
that I can practically stop, can't I, because I've made the
fundamental point.
No. I do have to say one thing about oral, and written,
before I stop. The division between your oral argument and your
brief is quite clear. Your brief has to provide the Court with the
technical wherewithal to be perfectly happy in deciding your
way with no qualms of legal conscience at all. And _your brief
is quite
ought also to provide, at some place,-Kenison
magnificent on this: Kenison says that at an appropriate place
your brief ought to say, "A suggested rationale for this case,"
and thereby offer the court something that it can lift, verbatim,
into the opinion taking care of all prior authority, phrasing the
whole satisfactorily, and applying it to the case in hand.
He's quite right. But that's the job of the brief. The job of
the oral is two-fold: It's first to persuade the court that you ought
to win; and second, to make them read that brief. (Laughter.) A
much simpler thing, you see, a much simpler thing---complexity
of any kind has got to be kept out of the oral. You have an
opportunity in the oral to capture their attention, to make them
feel that this is the most important case of this particular term.
You've got a chance to look at them and see whether it's getting
across. You've got a chance to answer their particular questions.
If you by any chance have, as you may have, a panel that you
don't know about ahead of time so that you have to write your
brief blind-take the case of the Circuit Courts, who sit in
22. Kenison, supra note 4.
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threes, and who knows what three are going to be drawnyou've got a chance in the oral argument to talk to them. And
see what's up. And watch their faces. And answer their
questions.
No, the oral is vital on that. But above all, the oral has got
to make sure that no matter how the court works-whether, as
some courts do, they read the briefs before the oral, or whether,
as some courts do, they, on principle, never read the briefs
before the oral, or whether, as some other courts do, they assign
the briefs to be read by someone to be reported on-no matter
which way that goes, the oral is the place where you've got a
chance to talk to them all. Therefore, you need to interest them
in that brief. You've got to make them feel that when they come
to the brief, "Oh, baby; is it going to be hot." And they've got to
approach the brief with that favorable atmosphere that you need.
Now, that is one school of thought, which says that when
the respondent gets up after the facts have been stated by the
appellant, he is going to kill his case, if he has the court saying,
"Oh, my lord, have we got to listen to this again?" I've said
before, and I hope have made it clear, that this is a vicious,
utterly vicious, theory of argument. You can not join issue on a
well done job by your adversary. The guy who answers the
points as they appear in the appellant's brief is the guy who runs
himself up against that lovely phrase from Hamlet, "The lady
doth protest too much, methinks." (Laughter.) And, by the time
you have made the fourth denial, it is perfectly clear to the court
that there is more than smoke; there is indeed fire in the
appellant's case.
You need your positive case, not only in the law; you need
your positive case in the facts. I have indicated in my book a
couple of ways in;2 3 I'll mention just one because my time is
running out. If you start to say, "The facts are different," or
"These are the facts," they'll go to sleep on you, or get mad at
you. But if on the other hand you say, "There is one point that I
don't think my brother has developed quite as fully as he
might," and pick up some fact or other that you can build on, by
the time you get done with that, you can swing into the recital of
the whole.
23. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS, 239 n.238.
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(Laughter and applause, as Professor Llewellyn withdraws
from the podium. The applause continued, and Professor
Llewellyn came forward once again, as follows:)
Now listen you folks, applause doesn't count; what counts
is action.

